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TAXATION OF EMPLOYEE ACCIDENT AND HEALTH PLANS
BEFORE AND UNDER THE 1954 CODE
MANY employers have established accident and health programs in order
to compensate their employees for off-the-job disability.1 These arrange-
ments generally provide reimbursement for medical or hospitalization ex-
penses, compensation for loss of earnings, or both.2 Some programs are
established voluntarily by the employer, others are set up through collective
bargaining, and still others are required by state nonoccupational disability
statutes. 3 These programs may be financed by employer contributions, em-
ployee contributions, or joint contributions.4 They may be commercially in-
sured, funded, or administered by the employer.5
Before the 1954 Code the tax treatment of employee health plans was un-
certain because of the absence of explicit statutory provisions. Under the old
Code, amounts paid under such programs were taxable unless they fell within
the exemptions for damages, workmen's compensation, or accident or health
insurance. 6 Controversy particularly centered about the scope of the accident
or health insurance exemption. Since the term "insurance" could clearly not
be applied to all types of accident or health arrangements, and since the criteria
of "insurance" were uncertain, this provision of the old Code bred both con-
fusion and inequity. In an attempt to remedy these problems, Congress, in
revising the Internal Revenue Code in 1954, established specific rules relating
to accident and health programs. 7 An examination of the meaning and merit
of the new statute in its application to such arrangements focuses upon three
questions: Are proceeds tax-free when received by the employee? Are the
employer's contributions taxable to the employee? Can the employee deduct
his own contributions?
1, See, in general, Gordon, Tax Effects of Union Welfare Funds, 6 TAX L. REv. 1
(1950) ; Schlenger, Disability Benefits Under Section 22 (b)(5), 40 VA. L. REv. 549 (1954) ;
Rubenstein & Wolk, Sickness and Accident Benefits in Union Agreements, 1949, 70
MONTHLY LAE. REv. 636 (1950).
2. See, e.g., Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508, 509 (7th Cir. 1952) (providing
medical, hospitalization, surgical, and loss of earnings benefits). Some programs also In-
clude compensation for specific disability such as loss of a limb or sight. See Van Zantan
v. National Casualty Co., 333 Mich. 28, 30, 52 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1952).
3. On voluntary and collectively bargained programs see authorities cited note 1 supra.
For a general discussion of state nonoccupational disability statutes, see Comment, 60 YALE
L.J. 647 (1951) ; Honey, Compulsory Nonocenpational Disability Benefits Legislation, 1952
INS. L.J. 691 (1952).
4. See Rubenstein & Wolk, stepra note 1 (employer and employer-employee contribu-
tions) ; Rev. Rul. 208, 1953 INT. REv. BULL. No. 21, at 1 (1953) (employee contributions).
5. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 3; Rubenstein & Wolk, supra note 1.
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, §22(b) (5); I.T. Info. No. 4, 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAX Ri'.
16051 (1951). For a discussion of damages and workmen's compensation as exempt from
federal income taxation see Schlenger, supra note 1, at 553, 557.
7. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 104(a) (3), 105, 106.
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PROCEEDS
Old Code
Under the old Code,8 taxability of proceeds received by an employee from an
accident or health program hinged on whether that program could be categorized
as "insurance." 9 Section 22(b) (5) excluded from gross income "amounts re-
ceived, through accident or health insurance... as compensation for personal
injuries or sickness.. . ,"10' except to the extent such amounts were attributable
to medical expense deductions taken in any prior year.11 The term "accident
or health insurance" was interpreted to include both loss of earnings and medi-
cal expense insurance.12 Commercially insured arrangements 13 automatically
8. IxTr. REv. CODE OF 1939.
9. See, in general, Schlenger, Disability Bcnefits Under Scction 22(b)(5), 40 IVA. L
REv. 549 (1954); Comment, 21 U. oF CHL L. REv. 277 (1954); 51 Micu. L REv. 1248
(1953).
10. INT. REv. CODE oF 1939, § 22: "(b) ExcLusioNs FROM GRoss Ixcom&.-The follow-
ing items shall not be included in gross income and shall be exempt from taxation under
this chapter:...
"(5) COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES OR sIcK E s.-Except in the case of amounts attribu-
table to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under Section 23(x) in any prior tax-
able year, amounts received through accident or health insurance or under workmen's com-
pensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any
damages received whether by suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness, and
amounts received as a pension, annuity, or similar allowance for personal injuries or sick-
ness resulting from active service in the armed forces of any country";
The exclusion is available to beneficiaries who have an insurable interest in the health
of the insured, such as the insured, his family or his employer. Castner Garage, Ltd., 43
B.T.A. 1. (1940). But cf. Peoples Finance & Thrift Co. v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 836
(5th Cir. 1950), affirming 12 T.C. 1052 (1949) (creditor transferees for value not entitled
to the exemption).
11. The exception to § 22(b) (5) is designed to complement the medical expense deduc-
tion allowed by § 23 (x). See U.S. Treas. Reg. 118 § 39.23(x) (-1) (1953), as amended by
T.D. 56S7, 1949-1 Cum. BULL 9, 15. The latter section grants a deduction for medical ex-
penses not compensated for by insurance or otherwise in the taxable year. The § 22(b) (5)
exception probably means that insurance proceeds received in subsequent years are taxable
only if they would have reduced the medical deduction if received in a prior year. The Tax
Court has held that only medical and hospitalization benefits reduce the medical deduction
while loss-of-earnings proceeds do not, since they "compensate" for lost wages rather than
medical expenses. Robert 0. Deming, Jr., 9 T.C. 383 (1947), aeq., 1948-1 Cum. BuL. 1.
Therefore, it may be inferred that only medical and hospitalization benefits fall within the
meaning of the § 22(b) (5) exception.
Section 105 of the new Code specifically adopts this interpretation. Dening is codified
by new § 105 (f). And the old § 22(b) (5) exception is made applicable only to medical re-
imbursements by § 105 (b).
12. See Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 50 (7th Cir.), reversing 52-1 U.S. TAX
CAs. 19261 (N.D. Ind. 1952); Fred XV. Staudt, 12 T.C.M. 1417 (1953) ; Robert 0. Dem-
ing, Jr., 9 T.C. 383 (1947) ; I.T. 3928, 1948-2 Cum. BULL 9.
13. For a general discussion of commercial accident or health insurance, see Curran,
The Fundamentals of Accident and Health Instrance, 1953 INs. LJ. 555 (1953). See alsu,
VA cE, IxsURANcE 179-94, 203, 205 (3d ed. 1951).
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qualified as "insurance,"114 but private programs of an employee association
or an employer often did not.15 When a private arrangement failed to qualify,
its proceeds were fully taxable to the employee,1" except for a tax-free recovery
of his contributions.' 7 The status of such private programs was uncertain be-
cause of a dispute between the Internal Revenue Service and the Seventh
Circuit over what constituted "insurance."
The Service's definition of "insurance" excluded certain private loss-of-earn-
ings programs which it labeled "sick-leave.' 8 Such classification resulted in
taxation of proceeds.'0 Programs might fall into this sick-leave category even
14. Fred W. Staudt, 12 T.C.M. 14-17 (1953) ; Castner Garage, Ltd., 43 B.T.A. 1
(1940). See Wong Wing Non, 18 T.C. 205, 209 (1952); I.T. 4060, 1951-2 CuM. Bu.,
11, 13, modified on other grounds, I.T. 4107, 1952-2 CuM. BuLL. 73.
Accident or health plans of an employee association which qualified as an insurance com-
pany within U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797-7 (1953), and state fund accident or health
plans established under state sickness and disability statutes also qualified as "insurance"
within § 22(b) (5). I.T. 3928, 1948-2 Cum. BULL. 9 (employee association); I.T. 4015,
1950-1 Cum. BULL. 23 (state-fund), modified on other grounds, I.T. 4107, 1952-2 Cum.
BULL. 73; I.T. 4060, 1951-2 Cum. BULL. 11 (same).
15. See text at notes 18-21 infra.
16. See I.T. Info. No. 4, 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAX REP. 6051 (1951) ; Press Release,
5 CCH 1953 FED. TAx REP. 6136 (1953) ; rulings cited note 20 infra.
17. Rev. Rul. 54-2, 1954 INT. REv. BULL. No. 1 at 6 (1954). Cf. I.T. 1918, 111-1 CuIt.
BULL. 121 (1924) (private unemployment compensation plan). The tax-free recovery is
based on the theory that, to the extent of his contributions, the employee is receiving a
return of capital rather than income. Since the ruling states that benefits are to be tax-
free to the extent of all the employee's contributions, whenever made, it presumably applies
to contributions of prior years as well as the year of receipt. The ruling has the policy
justification of avoiding the harsh results of full taxation of benefits to a recipient who has
made contributions out of previously taxed income. But it seems legally incorrect, since
accident or health arrangements have no savings feature. Benefits are attributable only to
current contributions, which are thus more properly regarded as expenses than invest-
ments. See VANCE, INSURANCE § 179 (3d ed. 1951).
18. Press Release, 5 CCH 1953 FED. TAx REP. 1 6136 (1953); G.C.M. 23511, 1943
Cum. BULL. 86. See rulings cited note 20 infra.
Prior to January 1, 1953, private plans approved under state sickness and disability
statutes were regarded by the Service as "insurance." I.T. 4000, 1950-1. Cum. BULL 21;
I.T. 4015, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 23; I.T. 4060, 1951-2 Cumx. BULL. 11. However, the Service
subsequently ruled that, beginning in 1953, private plans approved by state statutes would
be subject to the criteria of "insurance" laid down for non-statutory, private plans. I.T.
4107, 1952-2 Cum. BULL. 73.
On state sickness and disability statutes in general, see Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 647
(1951); Honey, Compulsory Nowccapational Disability Benefits Legislation, 1952 INs.
L.J. 691 (1952) ; 1 SYRAcUsE L. REv. 278 (1949).
19. I.T. Info. No. 4, 5 CCH 1952 FE. TAx REP. 1 6051 (1951) ; see rulings cited note
20 infra.
Many private accident or health arrangements provide for payment of the difference
between amounts received as workmen's compensation and regular salary. Prior to August
1, 1953, such differential payments were excludable under § 22(b) (5) either as "workmen's
compensation" if received for injury or sickness which arose out of and in the course of
employment, or as "damages received ... by ... agreement" if the terms of the plan re-
quired the employee to waive his rights at law on electing payment under the plan. Special
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though they met such undisputed criteria of insurance as contractual enforce-
ability, definition of risks covered, and specification of benefits provided. -°
Factors which might result in the Service's designation of a plan as sick-leave
were: relation of amount or duration of benefits to rate of salary or length of
employment; lack of substantial employee contributions; payments of benefits
by the employer directly to the employee rather than through a separate fund.2'
It was not clear what weight the Service would assign to each of these factors,
and consequently the tax status of many private arrangements was uncertain
until specific rulings were obtained.
The Seventh Circuit defined "insurance" more broadly in Epnieier v. United
States.2 2 There an insurance company had provided its employees with sick-
ness benefits based upon rate of salary and length of service. The employees
made no contributions other than their usual services. Benefits were paid
directly by the employer, rather than from a separate fund. Thus the program
contained all the factors regarded by the Service as indicia of sick-leave. Never-
theless, the court held that the plan was one of "insurance," since it provided
contractually enforceable benefits indemnifying against loss from specified con-
tingencies.23 Despite the fact that the employer was an insurance company, the
ruling, 5 CCH 1951 FED. TAx REP. ff 6243 (1945) (workmen's compensation); Special
ruling, 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAX REP. T 6036 (1951) (same); I.T. 3306, 1939-2 Czum. BuL.
149 (damages). But cf. Special ruling, 5 P-H 1947 FED. TAX SEar 176,215; G.C.M.
23511,1943 Cum. BuLL. 86.
However, the Service more recently ruled that differential payments received after
Aug. 1, 1953, which are not paid under a plan of accident or health "insurance" are ta.Mble
as income unless either paid pursuant to a court-sanctioned agreement which, according
to state statute, is in lieu of workmen's compensation, or paid as damages under an agree-
ment in satisfaction of tort liability other than liability under a workmen's compemsation
act. Rev. Rul. 103, 1953-1 Cum. Bu.. 20; Rewrite bulletin, 5 CCH 1953 FE. TAx REP.
f1 8598 (1953). See Schlenger, Disability Benefits under Section 22(b)(5), 40 IVA. L REV.
549,553 (1954).
20. G.C.M. 23511, 1943 Cum. BULL. 86; Rev. Rul. 54-1, 1954 INT. REv. BuLu. No. 1
at 5 (1954) ; Rev. Rul. 209, 1953 I.r. REv. BuLL. No. 21 at 3 (1953) ; Rev. Rul. 103, 1953
INT. REv. BuL. No. 13 at 2 (1953) ; I.T. 4107, 1952-2 Cum. Buz.. 73. But ci. Rev. Rul.
269, 1953 INT. REv. BULL No. 26 at 3 (1953); Rev. Rul. 208, 1953 INT. REv. BuLL No. 21
at I (1953).
Neither the Service nor the courts regarded accident or health arrangements which
failed to meet these criteria as "insurance"' within § 22(b) (5). Epmeier v. United States,
52-1 U.S. TAx CAs. 1 9251 (N.D. Ind.), rev'd, 199 F.2d 50 (7th Cir. 1952); I.T. 3738,
1945-1 Cum. BuLL. 90.
For discussion of the elements of insurance, see VAxcE, INsuRAncE § 1 (3d ed. 1951);
12 APPLEmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcrICE § 7001 (1941).
21. See authorities cited notes 18 and 20 supra; Rewrite Bulletin, 5 CCH 1953 FED. TAx
REP. 118515 (1953).
22. 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952). See Schlenger, Disability Benefits Under Section
22(b)(5), 40 VA. L. REv. 549, 575 (1954) ; Comment, 21 U. oF C11. L REv. 77 (1954);
51 Micr. L. REv. 1248 (1953); 14 Oo ST. L.J. 338 (1953).
23. Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952).
"Insurance, of ancient origin, involves a contract, whereby, for an adequate considera-
tion, one party undertakes to indemnify another against loss arising from certain specified
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court apparently treated the plan as a typical sick-leave arrangement rather
than as commercial insurance.24
Epmeier correctly established that a plan could be both sick-leave and in-
surance. The Service's requirement that benefits be unrelated to rate of salary
and length of employment was irrelevant to the issue of whether a program
was one of insurance. Although an arrangement cannot constitute insurance
without provision for some benefits, the particular kind of benefits is pertinent
only to a description of the insurance provided.26 Likewise, substantial em-
ployee contributions are not an essential constituent of insurance. The exist-
ence of insurance does not presuppose that the beneficiary pay the premiums.2 "
Furthermore, even if separate fund maintenance be regarded as a necessary
safeguard to financial security in certain types of private plans, 7 the security
function in other such arrangements is satisfied by statutory regulation. These
regulated arrangements include the Epineier kind of situation, where the em-
ployer is a regulated insurance company, as well as plans approved under state
compulsory disability insurance statutes.2 8  However, despite Epincier's re-
contingencies or perils. Fundamentally and shortly, it is contractual security against possi-
ble anticipated loss. Risk is essential and, equally so, a shifting of its incidence from one
to another. [cases cited]" Id. at 509-10.
24. The fact that the employer is a licensed insurance company is mentioned in the
case only in the statement of facts and is not alluded to as a factor in the decision. The
following discussion in the opinion indicates that it was not such a factor: "In determin-
ing whether the benefits under consideration are within the statute and in accord with
these general principles, we observe, first, that the plan under which the payments were
made is not in the physical form of ordinary formal insurance contracts sold commercially,
but instead is included in a company document with other subject matters having to do
with the employer-employee relationship." Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508, 510
(7th Cir. 1952).
25. See VANCE, INSURANCE § 7 (3d ed. 1951). Loss-of-earnings insurance has become
very important. It is written in individual and group commercial policies. See Curran, The
Fundamentals of Accident and Health Insurance, 1953 INS. L.J. 555 (1953) ; SommEr,
MANUAL OF ACCIDENT AND HEALTut INSURANCE 21-4 (1928) ; and it is required for em-
ployees by statutes in some states. See Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 647 (1951); Honey,
Compulsory Nonoccupational Disability Benefits Legislation, 1952 INs. L.J. 691 (1952).
26. Monast v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 32 R.I. 557,567, 79 Atl. 932, 936 (1911). Accord:
New York Life Ins. Co. v. McJunkin, 227 Ala. 228, 149 So. 663 (1933) ; VANCE, INSuit-
ANCE 303 (3ded. 1951).
And even if premium payments by the beneficiary were considered a requisite of in-
surance, the employees covered by a sick-leave arrangement could be regarded as paying
the premiums through services rendered or to be rendered. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y
of United States v. Commonwealth, 113 Ky. 126,67 S.W. 388 (1902) ; The Kentucky Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Jenks, 5 Ind. 96 (1854).
27. Where the plan calls for direct payment of benefits from employer to employee,
the requirement of a separate fund may be necessary to assure payment to the employee.
28. Private plans under state sickness and disability statutes must be approved by state
authorities. Generally the employer must post a bond or deposit securities as evidence of
financial security. CAL. UNEMPL. INS. CODE §§ 3258, 3262 (Deering, 1954) ; N.Y. Woi:-
MEN'S COMP. LAW § 211. But cf. 43 N.J.S.A. §§ 21-32 through 21-35 (1950).
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jection of the dichotomy between insurance and sick-leave, the Service con-
tinued to insist that the two were incompatible.2 0
The strange criteria of "insurance" promulgated by the Service were based
upon policy considerations which could not be consistently implemented under
the inflexible provisions of the old Code. The Service's bias against arrange-
ments which tied benefits to rate of salary and length of employment was based
upon the seeming unfairness of excluding payments in lieu of earnings while
taxing earnings.30 Consistent application of that policy would have required
taxation of all loss-of-earnings proceeds. But loss-of-earnings features were
often written in commercial accident or health policies,3 ' and therefore were
clearly excludable as amounts received through "insurance."3 - The Service's
preference for arrangements supported substantially by employee contributions
apparently was motivated by the fact that tax-free compensation of employees
would result if a program principally supported by employer contributions were
labeled "insurance. 13 3 This would occur because employer contributions to
such arrangements were generally not taxable to the employee, 4 and proceeds
attributable to such contributions would also be tax-free if the arrangement
qualified as "insurance." Yet such tax-free compensation of employees was
obtainable under commercially insured plans, since it was clear that these
plans constituted "insurance." 35 In order to apply a consistent policy against
tax-free compensation of employees through accident or health arrangements,
the Service would have had to tax to the employee all proceeds attributable
to tax-free employer contributions. But the rigid phrase in the old Code ex-
cludipg all "amounts received, through accident or health insurance" precluded
any interpretation upon which such a policy could be predicated.
New Code
General Provisions
While the new Code pretends to establish a statutory framework within
which the Service's policy views can be implemented, in reality it is only a
facade. Section 104(a) (3) continues the general exclusion from gross income
of amounts received through accident or health insurance.30 But complementary
29. Press Release, 5 CCH 1953 FED. TAX REP. f 6136 (1953); I.T. 4107, 1952-2 Cum.
BULL- 73.
30. Press Release, 5 CCH 1953 FED. TAx RE. f 6136 (1953); G.C.M. 23511, 1943
CU .BULL. 86.
31. See note 25 supra.
32. See note 14 mtpra.
33. Press Release, 5 CCH 1953 FED. TAX REP. f 6136 (1953).
34. See text at notes 108-10 infra.
35. See note 14 supra.
36. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 104(a) (3):
"(a) Ix GENEAL.-Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess
of) deductions allowed under Section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any
prior taxable year, gross income does not include....
"(3) amounts received through accident or health insurance for personal injuries
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clauses in Sections 104(a)(3) and 105 (a) provide that, as a rule, gross in-
come includes accident or health insurance proceeds attributable to employer
contributions not taxable to the employee.37 These clauses embody the view of
the Service that accident or health arrangements should not be used as a de-
vice for tax-free compensation of employees.3 8 But this rule is rendered a
virtual nullity by sweeping exceptions contained in Sections 105(b), (c), and
(d). They exclude from gross income all insurance proceeds which represent
medical reimbursements, 39 permanent injury payments related to the nature
of the injury and not to the period of disability,40 and loss-of-earnings benefits
up to $100 per week.41 Thus the Service's policy against tax-free compensation
actually is effectuated only with regard to loss-of-earnings proceeds in excess
or sickness (other than amounts received by an employee, to the extent such amounts
(A) are attributable to contributions by the employer which were not includible
in the gross income of the employee, or (1) are paid by the employer)."
37. Ibid.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 105(a):
"(a) AmtouNTS ATRrIBUTABLE To EMPLOYER CONTRIBUrIONs.-Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this section, amounts received by an employee through accident or health insur-
ance for personal injuries or sickness shall be included in gross income to the extent such
amounts (1.) are attributable to contributions by the employer which were not includible
in the gross income of the employee, or (2) aTe paid by the employer."
38. See text at notes 33-4 supra.
39. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 105(b):
"(b) AMOUNTS EXPENDED FOR MEDICAL CARE.
Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed
under Section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year, gross
income does not include amounts referred to in subsection (a) if such amounts are paid,
directly or indirectly, to the taxpayer to reimburse the taxpayer for expenses incurred by
him for the medical care (as defined in section 2 13(e)) of the taxpayer, his spouse, and
his dependents (as defined in section 152)."
40. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 105(c) :
"(C) PAYMENTS UNRELATED TO ABSENcE FROM WORK.-
"Gross income does not include amounts referred to in subsection (a) to the extent
such amounts-
"(1) constitute payment for the permanent loss or loss of use of a member or function
of the body, or the permanent disfigurement, of the taxpayer, his spouse, or a dependent
(as defined in section 152), and
"(2) are computed with reference to the nature of the ihijury without regard to the
period the employee is absent from work."
41. INT. REV. CODEOF 1954, § 105(d):
"(d) WAGE CONTINUATION PLANs.-Gross income does not include amounts referred
to in subsection (a) if such amounts constitute wages or payments in lieu of wages for a
o period during which the employee is absent from work on account of personal injuries or
sickness; but this subsection shall not apply to the extent that such amounts exceed a
weekly rate of $100. In the case of a period during which the employee is absent from
work on account of sickness, the preceding sentence shall not apply to amounts attributable
to the first 7 calendar days in such period unless the employee is hospitalized on account
of sickness for at least one day during such period. If such amounts are not paid on the
basis of a weekly pay period, the Secretary or his delegate shall by regulations prescribe
the method of determining the weekly rate at which such amounts are paid."
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of $100 per week. However, the Service's principle of distinguishing between
loss-of-earnings and other types of benefits is established by the limitations on
excludability of loss-of-earnings benefits.42 But this too must be considered a
pyrrhic victory, since loss-of-earnings proceeds up to $100 per week are tax-
exempt and probably few arrangements provide greater benefits of that type.4 a
A primary objective of the House version of Section 105 was to equalize
tax treatment of commercially and privately insured accident or health pro-
grams financed by employers.44 This reflected the principle of the Epmneer
case.45 The House replaced the old "insurance" criterion with a new test-
whether benefits were received under a "qualified plan (through insurance or
otherwise). 46 Qualification depended upon compliance with detailed require-
ments that a plan be in the nature of insurance and not discriminate in
favor of high salaried employees. 47 However, the Senate not only eliminated
the House's qualification provisions, but also entirely removed the "qualified
plan" test and reinserted the old Section 22(b) (5) standard of "insurance." 43
42. Other types of accident or health benefits which fall within § 105(a) are exclud-
able in full under §§ 105(b) and 105(c). INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 105(a), (b), and (c).
For the Service's view on the need for a distinction between loss-of-earnings and other
accident or health benefits, see text at note 30 supra.
43. Curran, The Fundanwntals of Accident and Hcalth Inmrance, 1953 INs. LJ. 555,
568 (1953), estimates that the usual group disability policy provides weekly benefits at
two-thirds of salary up to $40 per week plus optional medical, surgical, and hospital benefits.
44. See H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess § 105 (1954) ; R.L REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 15, A32 (1954).
45. See text at notes 22-4 supra.
46. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 105 (1954):
"(a) GENERAL RuLE.-Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and not in excess
of) deductions allowed under Section 213 (relating to medical, etc., e-xpenses) for any prior
taxable year, and except as provided in subsection (b), gross income does not include
amounts received by an employee under a qualified employer's accident or health plan as
compensation for personal injuries or sickness ....
"(c) DFirNmo.Ns.-
"(1) QuALFIa Em'LOER's ACCIDENT OR HEALTH PLA.-For purposes of this section,
the term "qualified employer's accident or health plan" means a plan of an employer for
the exclusive benefit of his employees-
"(A) which provides (through insurance or otherwise) compensation for personal in-
juries or sickness;
"(B) under which all employees covered by the plan have (while the plan remains in
effect) an enforceable right to the compensation provided under the plan;
"(C) which (if the plan were a pension plan) would qualify under section 501(e) with
respect to-
(i) the employees covered by the plan,
(ii) the contributions to the plan, and
(iii) the benefits payable under the plan;
except that for purposes of this subparagraph, wages shall be taken into account without
regard to the $4,000 exclusion contained in section 501 (e) (4) (A) ; an...
47. Ibid.
48. Senate Amendment No. 32 to H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). See note 37
supra for the new Code version of § 105 (a), which is substantially as inserted by the Senate.
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Thus, commercial insurance proceeds continue to be excludable under the new
Code. But whether a private program constitutes "insurance" remains as un-
certain as ever.49
Yet the Senate was not unaware of the need for equalizing tax treatment in
this field. Section 105(e) of the new Code, inserted by the Senate, states that
amounts received under a "plan for employees" shall be treated as "insurance"
within the meaning of Sections 104 and 105.60 This raises the question of
whether the phrase "plan for employees" is to be interpreted together with
the term "insurance" or as a separate category of qualification. If they are
considered related terms, a reasonable interpretation would treat "insurance"
as meaning only commercial insurance, and "plan for employees" as limited
to private plans of the Epmeier type, that is, plans in the nature of insurance.51
The desirability of this interpretation lies in the predictability of its applica-
tion and the ease of its administration.52 However, the term "insurance" can
be interpreted as retaining its uncertain Section 22(b) (5) meaning,53 and
the phrase "plan for employees" may be regarded as an independent qualify-
The Senate Report gives no explanation for the insertion of the term "insurance" as a
qualifying test in § 105. There is not even a reference to the fact that the change was
made, other than a bare recitation of the amendment. It is quite possible that the term
"insurance" was unintentionally inserted in an attempt to clarify the meaning of § 105. The
Report states that "the exemption is to be granted only to benefits paid out under an ar-
rangement which constitutes a plan," although it is not clear whether that statement applies
to all of § 105 or only to private arrangements for employees. SEx. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 185, 15 (1954). Whatever the intent of Congress might have been, the
statutory language of § 105 clearly grants the exemptions therein for amounts received
through insurance.
49. See pp. 223-27 supra.
50. INT. Rev. CODE OF 1954, § 105(e) states:
"For purposes of this section and section 104-.
"(1) amounts received under an accident or health plan for employees, and
"(2) amounts received from a sickness and disability fund for employees main-
tained under the law of a State, a Territory, or the District of Columbia,
shall be treated as amounts received through accident or health insurance."
See Se. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, 183 (1954).
It is not clear whether § 105(e) (2) applies only to state-fund plans or to all plans ap-
proved under a state statute. This question does not seem too significant, since a statutorily
approved private plan will probably qualify as a "plan for employees."
51. See text at notes 22-4 supra. Under this interpretation, requisites of a "plan"
would be contractual enforceability, definition of risks covered, and specification of benefits
provided.
52. If the standards of insurance are cast aside, there do not appear to be any objective-
ly determinable criteria allowing for a clear definition of "plan" short of a definition which
would include all accident or health benefits received by an employee. Since such an all
inclusive interpretation is apparently prohibited by the statute and commentaries, see note
61, infra, "plan" would become not only an undefined but an undefinable entity.
The question of the necessary breadth of a "plan" in terms of number of employees
covered is a separate issue and is discussed pp. 233-35 infra.
53. See pp. 223-27 supra.
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ing test. If this view is adopted, beneficiaries of employer-financed accident or
health arrangements will have the double-barrelled argument that the program
constitutes either "insurance" or a "plan for employees." The old Code dis-
pute as to what private plans constitute "insurance" will be revived.r' And
the new phrase, "plan for employees," will become a subject of speculation;
for if it is not defined to mean only plan in the nature of insurance, the number
of its possible interpretations is almost infinite.
What is a plan for employees?
If "plan for employees" is viewed as an independent qualifying test, it is
likely to become a focal point for litigation. Important consequences attach to
qualification as a "plan for employees." Employer contributions to such a pro-
gram are excludable from the employee's gross income under Section 1 0 6 .55
And since Section 105 (e) provides that "plan[s] for employees" be treated as
"insurance" within the meaning of Sections 104 and 105,r G proceeds attributable
to employee contributions will be exempt under Section 104(a) (3)," and pro-
ceeds attributable to employer contributions or paid directly by the employer
will be exempt under Section 105.58 But if an arrangement fails to constitute
a "plan for employees," the exemptions granted by Sections 104(a) (3) and
105 will be lost unless the arrangement independently qualifies as "insur-
ance."' 9 And whether or not the arrangement constitutes "insurance," the
Section 106 exclusion, applicable to employer contributions, will be unavailable
if the arrangement is not a "plan for employees."c0 The Code fails to define
"plan for employees" and the legislative commentaries are both sketchy and
ambiguous.
The term "plan" signifies something more than one or more ad hoc benefit
payments. 6' Thus an employer payment to an injured or sick employee will
54. Ibid.
55. IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 106:
"Gross income does not include contributions by the employer to accident or health plans
for compensation (through insurance or otherwise) to his employees for personal injuries
or sickness."
See general discussion of employer contributions, pp. 239-43 infra.
56. See note 50 supra.
57. See note 36 supra.
58. See notes 39-41 supra. A $100 per week limitation will apply to amounts received
in lieu of wages.
59. An accident or health arrangement which does not qualify as a "plan for employees"
will not fall within the provisions of § 105(a), unless it is an "insurance" arrangement. See
text at note 48 supra. The exemptions in §§ 105(b) and (c) are available only to arrange-
ments which fall within § 105(a). See notes 36, 37, and 39-41 supra. Therefore, proceeds
from a non-qualifying arrangement are ineligible for the exemptions in §§ 105(b), (c), and
(d).
60. See note 55 mtpra.
61. The Senate Finance Committee Report on § 105 contains the limiting statement
that exemptions under § 105 are to be granted "only to benefits paid out under an arrange-
ment which constitutes a plan." SEN. R,. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1954).
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probably not constitute a "plan" without evidence of an established practice or
a prior arrangement. But to state what types of arrangements will constitute
"plan[s]" is impossible because of congressional failure even to suggest any
definition. 62 One possibility is that the term "plan" requires merely an in-
formal, unenforceable understanding that an employer will "take care" of his
employees at his discretion during a period of disability.03 From this extreme,
interpretations run the gamut to the view that a "plan" must provide specific
coverage and benefits, and be communicated to the employees covered.0 4 This
would bring the meaning of "plan" close to a codification of Epmeicr and be
both practicable and predictable. 5 But unless the Regulations adopt this posi-
tion, it is likely that arrangements of a more discretionary nature will qualify.
An additional interpretive problem is whether general partners and sole pro-
prietors can be included in a "plan for employees." Cases and rulings dealing
with the somewhat analogous employee pension plan section of the Code treat
corporate executives as employees,06 but hold that general partners and sole
proprietors are not.67 An entire pension plan may be disqualified if a partici-
Furthermore, § 104 of the new Code specifically enumerates the types of payments for
personal injuries or sickness which are exempt. They are workmen's compensation,
damages, accident or health insurance, and payments for injuries or sickness resulting
from active service in the armed forces of any country or in the Coast and Geodetic Survey
or the Public Health Service. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 104. If the term "plan" included
within its meaning all payments for personal injury or sickness, it would render most of
the specific exemptions unnecessary. That result, if intended by Congress, could have been
accomplished more easily by a broad statement exempting all payments received from an
employer for -personal injuries or sickness.
62. See note 61 supra and notes 63 and 64 infra.
63. Support for this interpretation lies in the Senate's deletion of the House qualification
provisions, which included a requirement of contractual enforceability. See note 46 supra.
However, this position is weakened by the Senate Finance Committee's limiting state-
ment that exemptions are to be granted under § 105 "only to benefits paid out under an
arrangement which constitutes a plan." SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess, 185
(1954) (emphasis added). Moreover, there are indications that the phrase was intended
to cover only private plans in the nature of insurance. See note 64 infra.
64. This interpretation can be supported by analogizing "plan for employees" under
§ 105 to old § 22(b) (1) (B), which excluded from gross income certain death benefits re-
ceived under a contract of an employer. I NT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 22(b) (1) (B). The
regulations provide that, for a "plan" to qualify under this section, it must make provision
for payments and be promulgated to the employees covered. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.22
(b) (1)-2 (1953). For another possible supporting analogy, see INT. REv. CoDE or 1939,
§ 165 (a) and regulations, delineating qualification provisions for employee's pension, profit-
sharing, stock bonus, and annuity "plans."
65. See notes 51 and 52 supra.
66. See Kintner v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Mont. 1952) ; Volckening Inc.,
13 T.C. 723 (1949) ; Betty C. Stockvis, 10 T.C.M. 74 (1951) ; P.S. No, 27, 3 CCH 19,14
FED. TAx REP. f16557 (1944). But cf. Bentley v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 668 (2d Cir.),
affirming 14 T.C. 228 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 943 (1951) ; Smith & Sons Co. v.
Commissioner, 184 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1951).
67. Bentley v. Commissioner, supra note 66; I.T. 3350, 1940-1 Cum. BULL. 64; P.S,
No. 15, 3 CCH 1944 FED. TAx REP. 116531. (1944) ; see I.T. 3268, 1939-1 Cum. BOL. 196;
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pant is not an employee, 68 since the relevant Code section provides that such a
plan must be for the exclusive benefit of employees. 69 But Section 105(e),
relating to accident or health plans, does not have an exclusive benefit clause.70
The House bill contained such a clause but the Senate deleted it,7' apparently
in response to urgings that plans should not be disqualified on technicalities. 72
It may be reasonably inferred from this deletion that participation of general
partners and sole proprietors in an arrangement which otherwise qualifies as
a "plan for employees" will not cause disqualification. Moreover, proceeds
received by a general partner or sole proprietor under a "plan for employees"
will probably be wholly tax-exempt under Section 104(a) (3) by virtue of the
Section 105(e) provision that such amounts be treated as received through
accident or health insurance." This result seems justified, since the partner or
proprietor will be unable to deduct that portion of his contributions allocable
to his coverage as an ordinary and necessary business expense.7 4 If he had
purchased commercial insurance, the proceeds would be clearly tax-exempt
under Section 104(a) (3). 75 Therefore, in accordance with the policy of the
Code to equalize tax treatment between commercially insured and privately
financed arrangements, 76 the partner or proprietor should not be penalized for
participating in a "plan for employees."
Ambiguity prevails as to how broadly based a "plan" must be in terms of
employees covered. One view is that even an arrangement including only one
or a few employees is sufficient to qualify as a "plan," regardless of exclusion
P.S. No. 23, 3 CCH 1944 FED. TAx REP. ff6553 (1944). But cf. Arthur R. Kintner v.
United States, 107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Mont. 1952).
68. Ibid.
69. Ix. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 165(a) ; INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 401(a).
70. See note 50 supra.
71. See H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 105(c) (1) (1954) ; Senate Amendment No.
32 to HR. 8300 (1954).
72. See, e.g., Hearings before Committee on Finance on H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. pt. I, pp. 197-200 (1954) ; id. at pt. IV, pp. 1943, 1947-49.
73. See notes 36 and 50 supra.
It might be argued that amounts received by a partner or proprietor are not received
pursuant to a "plan for employees" and therefore do not constitute "insurance" within
either § 104 or § 105. But if such amounts are considered received through a "plan for
employees," they will probably be wholly tax-exempt under § 104(a) (3) rather than sub-
ject to the $100 a week limitation in § 105(d). Amounts received fall within § 104(a) (3),
unless covered by the parenthetical exception, which applies only to amounts received by
an employee. The exception will therefore not affect amounts received by a partner or
proprietor.
74. That portion of the contributions allocable to coverage of a general partner or a
sole proprietor will constitute non-deductible personal expenses under § 262. IxT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 262. Cf. Joseph Nussbaunm, 19 B.T.A. 868, 870 (1930) (life insurance
premiums; alternative holding).
75. See note 36 supra.
76. H.R. RaP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954); SEV. RaP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1954).
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of the remainder of their class or other classes of employees. 77 A second posi-
tion is that a "plan" must be available to at least an entire class of employees,
although other classes may be excluded.78 A third approach is that protection
must be available to substantially all employees without discrimination either
within or among classes. 7 9 Neither the Code, commentaries, nor hearings estab-
lish which of these interpretations Congress intended. And there is no clear
policy directive on which a choice can be predicated. The tax advantages con-
ferred on "plan [s] for employees" must be deemed to rest upon the policy of
77. This interpretation gains support from the Senate Finance Committee's state-
ment that the § 106 exclusion of employer contributions to a plan is applicable regardless
of whether the employer's plan covers one employee or a group of employees. SEX. Rir.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1954).
Further support lies in a presumption of deliberate vagueness in the Senate removal
of the House qualification provisions and substitution of the ambiguous phrase "plan for
employees." See text at notes 46-8 supra.
The interpretation may be countered by the contention that the § 106 statement applies to
an employer who has only one employee or one employee in a class. See also notes 78 and
79 infra. Moreover, this interpretation seems the worst from a policy view. It would
allow tax-free compensation not only of executives as a class but of executives and other
employees as individuals. Under such an interpretation, the employer could reward em-
ployees A and B with an accident or health "plan" rather than a straight cash bonus and
both contributions and proceeds would be tax-free to the recipient. Policy justification is
difficult to find. Although empirical data is unavailable, it may at least be tentatively
assumed that such allowance of tax-free compensation to individuals would not promote
broad coverage in the classes of employees who most need both the coverage and the tax
advantage.
Another factor which might indicate congressional intent against use of the phrase
"plan for employees" as a device for tax-free compensation of individuals is the President
of the United States' recommendation to Congress that accident or health protection on a
group basis be tax exempt. President's Budget Message to Congress, 100 CoNG. Rix. 570
(1954).
78. This position draws support from the Senate deletion of the House non-discrimi-
natory qualification provisions. See text at notes 46-8 supra. Further support is derived
by analogy from the regulations on employer death benefits under the old Code, which
provided that a plan, to qualify, had to cover at least a "class" of employees. It may be
noted that under those regulations an express contract covering less than a class would also
qualify. U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22(b)(1)-2(c) (1953). See also INT. Rsv. CooY or
1954, § 3121 (a) (2) (specifying the exclusion of certain amounts from definition of "wages"
under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act). Such amounts include payments by em-
ployers for employees' retirement, disability, medical, and hospitalization expenses, or death,
if such payments are made under a "plan" covering at least a "class" of employees. An
identical provision relating to definition of "wages" under the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act is contained in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3306(b) (2).
Another argument in favor of this interpretation is that Congress by providing a $100
per week maximum exemption on loss-of-earnings benefits established the non-discrimi-
natory limitation which it thought necessary. -Therefore, any inference of further fion-
discriminatory meaning is precluded. But see note 79 infra.
79. This approach derives support from the Senate Finance Committee statement (ex-
plaining the Senate deletion of the House non-discriminatory qualification provisions) that
the § 105 exemptions are "to be granted only to benefits paid out under an arrangement
which constitutes a plan." SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 185, 16 (1954) (emphasis
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encouraging accident or health coverage.80 But a broad competing policy is to
tax all income. Congress has the means to compile and evaluate the facts
necessary to select the definition of "plan for employees" which would best
balance these conflicting policies.8 ' But courts cannot collect this empirical data.
And even if they could, different courts would assign different values to the
competing policies and create conflicting rules of interpretation. Consequently,
the new Code increases judicial unpredictability in this area.
Because of the uncertainty as to the requisites of a "plan," employers con-
templating the establishment of an accident or health program of restricted
employee participation would be well advised to utilize commercial insurance.
This suggestion is especially applicable to companies where the number of em-
ployees sought to be covered is small and includes executive or highly compen-
sated employees. If the program is commercially insured the proceeds will be
tax-exempt under Sections 104 or 105 even if it fails to constitute a "plan,"S
and whether it is a "plan" will be significant only with regard to exclusion of
premium contributions under Section 106.83 And if that Section is unavailable
because the program is not a "plan," the employee can still contend that the
premiums are not sufficiently realized to constitute income.84 If a privately
financed sick-leave program is set up wherein the employer continues wage
payments during employee disability, the hypothetical premiums which the
added) (perhaps indicating that the House qualification provisions were deleted merely for
technical reasons and that an implied non-discriminatory meaning still remains).
Further support for the non-discriminatory interpretation of the phrase "plan for em-
ployees" is derived from the general assumption of the Treasury Department and witnesses
appearing before the Senate Finance Committee that such plans were meant to be non-dis-
criminatory. See, e.g., Statements of Marion B. Folsom, Under Secretary of the Treasury,
Hearings before Finwice Committee on H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. pt. I, p. 115 (1954) ;
James L. Madden, for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, id. at pt. IV, p.
1948 (1954), suggesting the removal of the House qualification provisions on grounds that
such mechanical tests are inappropriate to accident or health arrangements and that the
issue of discrimination can be handled better by testing the availability of comparable
benefits to all employees.
80. See President's Budget Message, 100 CoNo. REc. 570 (1954), where President
Eisenhower stated: "Insurance and other plans adopted by employers to protect their em-
ployees against the risks of sickness should be encouraged by removing the present un-
certainties in the tax law."
81. To determine whether a "plan for employees" should be permitted to involve dis-
crimination within or among classes, the competing policies must be weighed on the basis of
the answers to such questions as: How much do the favored employees need tax relief in
time of sickness? To what extent is it necessary to encourage health and accident pro-
grams for such employees? To what degree, if at all, would allowance of tax relief to
these employees impede the establishment of broadly based programs? How much revenue
would be lost through granting exemptions to such programs? With answers to the above
questions, Congress could decide whether the social benefits derived from any type of
arrangement justify the social cost paid by compromising the policy of taxing income.
82. See text at note 48 supra.
83. See text at notes 120-24 infra.
84. See pp. 24043 infra.
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employer pays himself will probably not constitute income to the employees,80
so that the Section 106 exclusion will be superfluous. But if the program fails
to constitute a "plan," the proceeds may be fully taxable.8 6 The recipient of
benefits from a private arrangement which is not a "plan" but is in the nature
of insurance can make the Epmeier argument that the arrangement should be
treated as "insurance. ' sT But that contention may have been weakened by
inclusion in the new Code of the term "plan," for it may be inferred that Con-
gress thereby intended "plan" to be the sole test for qualification of private
arrangements.
Company Charity
Although an employee may receive tax-exempt accident or health benefits
through a "plan for employees,"88 that type of program may require regularity
in payment of determinable benefits and therefore constitute a relatively fixed
charge to the employer.8 9 While his employees may prefer this kind of arrange-
ment, the employer may desire a more flexible oneY0 And even if he does
establish a "plan," the employer may wish to supplement its benefits when an
employee is struck by a particularly catastrophic sickness or accident. But if the
employer pays such benefits on an ad hoc basis, they will probably be taxable
as compensation, especially since the employer will attempt to deduct them as
ordinary and necessary expenses of the business.01 However, by establishing
85. Cf. authorities cited note 110 infra. See also Comment, 21 U. or Gi. L. Rv. 277,
280,286 (1954).
"The mere contractual right to a payment from any employer on the occurrence of
stated conditions would not seem to constitute income in the absence of the occurrence of
such conditions for an accrual basis taxpayer, and in the absence of both the occurrence
of the conditions and the receipt of payment for a cash basis taxpayer." Id. at 280. But
see Guttentag, Leonard, & Rodewald, Federal Income Taxation of Fringe Beiefits: A
Specific Proposal, 6 NAT. TAX. J. 250, 263 (1953), where it is suggested that the value of
the employee's coverage be taxed to him.
86. The proceeds will be taxable as "income" unless they fall within an exclusion
provision. I.T. Info. No. 4, 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAX REP. 6051 (1951) ; see text at notes
106-07 infra.
87. See text at notes 22-4 supra.
88. If the employer protects his employees through an arrangement which qualifies
as "insurance" but not as a "plan," the contributions may be taxed to the employee though
the proceeds will be tax-free. See text at note 60 supra.
89. See text at notes 61-5 supra.
90. If the term "plan" is very broadly construed, an employer may be able to set up
a committee with general instructions to grant aid in deserving cases. In the more likely
event that defined standards are necessary to qualification as a "plan," the employer would
need to restrict coverage of risks and benefits to a point where flexibility would be lost,
91. See text at notes 93-4 infra. The § 105 exclusions apply only to amounts received
through "insurance" or under a "plan for employees." Employer ad hoc payments will
certainly not constitute "insurance" and will probably not constitute a "plan." See text at
note 61. supra.
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and contributing to a company charity, the employer may be able to retain wvide
discretion and assure that payments will be tax-exempt to the recipients. 2
Ordinarily a payment by an employer to an employee is taxable because
classified as compensation rather than as a gift, even where the employee had
no legal claim to the payment.9 3 And this classification is almost conclusively
established if the employer treats the payments as compensation in order to
gain a business expense deduction.9 4 But if the employer makes contributions
to a company charity, they can be labeled gifts since the employer can deduct
them as charitable contributions instead of as business expenses.93 Although
such treatment by the employer will not conclusively establish that the pay-
92. On the tax incentives for private charitable foundations generally, see, Latcham,
Private Charitable Foundations: Some Tax and Policy Implicatiots, 98 U. oF PA. L. Rv.
617 (1950) ; Note, 34 VA. L. REv. 182 (1948).
93. See, e.g., Walker v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d 61, 62 (1st Cir. 1937) ; Commissioner
v. Bonwit, 87 F2d 764, 765 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Yuengling v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 971 (3d
Cir. 1934).
94. Botchford v. Commissioner, 81 F2d 914 (9th Cir. 1936); Cora B. Beatty, 7 B.T.A.
726 (1927) ; E.B. Tousek, 1 B.T.A. 1164 (1925). But cf. Rev. Rul. 131 1953 INT. REV.
Buit.T No. 15 at 7 (1953) (tornado disaster benefits paid to employees).
And if the employer is a corporation, the directors may have to treat the ayment as
compensation in order to remain within the scope of their authority. See Commissioner
v. Bonwit, 87 F2d 764, 765 (2d Cir. 1937).
95. Contributions to a charitable fund are deductible for federal income, estate, and
gift tax purposes within the Code's limits on charitable deductions. Moreover, not only
employers, but also stockholders, subsidiaries, or any other person can deduct contributions
to a charity. IxT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §§ 170 (income tax; individuals and corporations),
702(a) (4) (income tax; partners), 642(c) (income tax; estates and trusts), 545(b) (2)
(income tax; personal holding companies), 2055 (estate tax; citizens or residents), 2106
(a) (2) (estate tax; nonresidents not citizens), 2522 (gift tax), 503(e) (disallowance of
certain charitable deductions), 681. (limitation and disallowance of certain deductions for
contributions made in trust).
Contributions to a company charity have been held deductible as charitable contributions
in the following cases: T. J. Moss Tie Company, 18 T.C. 188 (1952), appeal disnisscd, 201
F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1953); Gimbel v. Commissioner, 54 F2d 780 (3d Cir. 1931); Eagan v.
Commissioner, 43 F2d 881 (5th Cir. 1930); Proctor Patterson, 34 B.T.A. 689 (1936),
petition disnissed, 90 F2d 1009, 1016 (6th Cir. 1937); John R. Sibley, 16 B.T.A. 915
(1929), Cf. Estate of Tarrant, 38 Cal. 2d 42, 237 P.2d 505 (1951) ; lit re Westinghouse's
Estate, 156 Misc. 320, 281 N.Y. Supp. 603 (Surr. Ct 1935). See Notes, 28 A.L.t2d 428
(1953) ; 71 A.L.R. 870 (1931).
Unlike contributions to a "plan for employees," which are deductible as business ex-
penses, see text at note 104 ulnra, charitable deductions do not have to be justified either as
ordinary and necessary or reasonable. Thus, within the limitations on charitable deductions,
employers are free to choose both the taxable year and the amount in which to make con-
tributions. By donating appreciated property.instead of cash, the donor can deduct the fair
market value while avoiding taxes on the appreciation in value. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 118,
§ 3923 (o) -1 (1953). On the avoidance of taxation on the appreciated value of charitable
gifts generally, see Griswold, Charitable Gifts of Income and the Internal Rcvenuc Code,
65 1LAv. L. REv. 84 (1951) ; Bittker, Charitable Gifts of Income and the Internal Re'enue
Code: Another View, 65 HAv. L. REv. 1375 (1952) ; Griswold, A Reply, 65 Haav. L. REv.
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ment received by the employee will constitute a "gift,""0 which is tax-exempt,
at least there will be no major obstacle to that classification. Where payments
have been received from an employer because of sickness and it did not appear
that the employer had treated the payments as business expenses, it has been
held that they were "gifts."' 7 Therefore, it seems probable that sickness bene-
fits received through a company charity will be excludable from gross income
as "gifts."98
A series of cases has held that a fund set up for the benefit of the employees
of a fairly large corporation can qualify as a charitable foundation. 0 To estab-
lish the charitable nature of the company fund, payments from it must be solely
for charitable purposes, i.e., based on sickness or need,100 and no part of its net
1389 (1.952) ; Roehner & Roehner, Realization: Adndnistrative Convenience or Constilu-
tional Requirewnt?, 8 TAx L. Rav. 173 (1953).
For the authority of corporate directors to make charitable contributions, see Note, 31
CoL. L. Rav. 136 (1931).
96. Bass v. Hawley, 62 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir. 1933) ; cf. Frank ICnowles, 5 TC, 525
(1945).
97. Schall v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1.949), reversing 11 T.C. 111 (1948);
David R. Daly, 3 B.T.A. 1042 (1926).
98. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a) (excluding from gross income the value of gifts).
Other cases holding that payments received by employees constitute tax-free gifts are:
Bogardus v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34 (1937); Mutch v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 390
(3d Cir. 1954), reversing 12 T.C.M. 705 (1953) ; Abernethy v. Commissioner, 211 F.2d 651
(D.C. Cir. 1954), reversing 20 T.C. 593 (1953) ; Hershman v. Kavanagh, 120 F. Supp. 956
(E.D. Mich. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 210 F.2d 654 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Frank Knowles, 5 T,C.
525, 534 (1945) ; William R. Ginn, 47 B.T.A. 41, 49 (1942). See Note, 42 Gto, L, 577
(1954) ; Note, 110 A.L.R. 285 (1937).
99. See T.J. Moss Tie Company, 18 T.C. 188 (1952), appeal dismissed, 201 F.2d 512
(8th Cir. 1953) (800 employees) ; Eagan v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1930)
(1470 employees, 6,000 beneficiaries including employees' dependents); John R. Sibley, 16
B.T.A. 915 (1952) (1800 to 3300 employees) ; Proctor Patterson, 34 B.T.A. 689, 691 (1936)
(860 to 1234 employees).
See also 3 Scorr, TRusTS § 375 (1939).
Employee contributions to a company fund, even if required as a condition to eligibility
for benefits, will not per se defeat charitable status. Young Men's Christian Ass'n Retire-
ment Fund, Inc., 18 B.T.A. 139 (1929); Mutual Aid and Benefit Ass'n of Forstmann and
Huffmann Employees v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1930), reversing 17 B.T.A.
967 (1929) ; Union Pacific Ry. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365 (8th Cir. 1894) ; G.C.M. 1.9028, 1937-2
Cum. BuLL. 125.
But if the fund is supported principally by regular employee contributions in considera-
tion for fixed benefits it will not constitute a charitable organization. C.R. Lindback
Foundation v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1945), affirming per curiam, 4 T.C. 652
(1945) ; Philadelphia and Reading Relief Ass'n, 4 B.T.A. 713 (1926) ; G.C.M. 20015, 1938-1
Cum. BuLL. 169; I.T. 2109, 111-2 CuA. BULL. 224 (1924). See also Shell Employees'
Benefit Fund, 44 B.T.A. 452 (1941); Pontiac Employees Mutual Benefit Ass'n, 15 B.T.A.
74 (1929) ; Employees Benefit Ass'n of American Steel Foundries, 14 B.T.A. 1166 (1929).
100. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501 (c) (3). See Eagan v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 881
(5th Cir. 1930) (to insure a living wage and to pay an income to employees unavoidably
unemployed because of a plant shut-down, accident, or sickness) ; Mutual Aid and Benefit
Ass'n of Forstmann and Huffmann Employees v. Commissioner, 42 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1930),
(Vol. 64:222
TAXATION OF EMPLOYEE PLANS
earnings may inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. 10
Retention of a large degree of control by the company's officers or directors
acting in a fiduciary capacity will not impair the charitable status of the foun-
dation, at least where contributions have been irrevocably made and the direc-
tors' control consists in selecting appropriate cases for charitable bounty. 102
But if the foundation engages in certain prohibited transactions or improperly
accumulates income, it may lose its charitable status.10 3
EMPLOYER CONTRMUTIONS
Under both the old and new Codes, employer payments for employee accident
or health protection are deductible as business expenses, whether made indi-
reversing 17 B.T.A. 967 (1929) (to provide medical and dental service and fixed sick and
death benefits) ; Harrison v. Barker Annuity Fund, 90 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1937) (to provide
annuities for employees and their widows of dissolved corporation) ; Y.M.C.A. Retirement
Fund, Inc., 18 B.T.A. 139 (1929) (same); Proctor Patterson, 34 B.T.A. 689 (1936),
petition dismissed, 90 F.2d 1009, 1016 (1937) (to loan or assist employees, former em-
ployees, or their dependents) ; T.J. Moss Tie Co., 18 T.C. 188 (1952), appeal dismissed,
201 F.2d 512 (8th Cir. 1953) (to provide sick, disability, and death benefits) ; John R. Sib-
ley, 16 B.T.A. 915 (1929) (same); Gimbel v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1931)
(to grant pensions, life insurance, relief, and educational scholarships) ; Estate of Tarrant,
38 Cal. 2d 42, 237 P.2d 505 (1951) (to provide pensions for retired employees) ; In re
Westinghouse's Estate, 156 Misc. 320, 281 N.Y. Supp. 603 (Surr. Ct. 1935) (for the benefit
and welfare of employees); G.C.M. 19028, 1937-2 CuM. BULL 125 (relief for disabled em-
ployees). See also Van Horn v. Lewis, 79 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1948) (United Mine
Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund of 1947 providing sickness, disability, and death
benefits held a charitable trust for purposes of administration) ; Union Pacific Ry. v. Artist,
60 Fed. 365 (8th Cir. 1894) (holding a company hospital for employees a charitable institu-
tion as a defense to a malpractice suit). But see Harvey v. Campbell, 107 F. Supp. 757 (N.D.
Tea. 1952) (a company trust which provided loans to employees to purchase company houses
,was not a charitable trust) ; United States v. Community Services, 189 F.2d 421 (4th Cir.
1951) (company corporation which operated a canteen refreshment service, a coal and
wood yard, a filling station and an electric appliance store exclusively for employees, and
the profits of which were destined for charitable organizations held not a charitable organi-
zation) ; Matter of Altman, 87 Misc. 255, 149 N.Y. Supp. 601 (Surr. Ct. 1914) (a company
corporation organized to promote the social, physical or economic welfare and efficiency of
employees held not a charitable but a benevolent corporation).
On charitable purposes generally, see 3 Scorr, TRUSTS §§ 368-76 (1939) ; Brunyate, The
Legal Definition of Charity, 61 L.Q. REv. 268 (1945).
101. INT. R V. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c) (3). See Northern Illinois College of Optometry
v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. 664 (1943) (denying tax-exempt status to an educational in-
stitution, the net earnings of which inured to the benefit of an individual).
The activities of a tax-exempt charitable organization must not consist in any substantial
part of carrying on propaganda influencing legislation, or participating in any political
campaign in behalf of any candidate for public office. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c) (3).
102. See T.J. Moss Tie Company, 18 T.C. 188 (1952), appeal disnissed, 201 F.2d 512
(8th Cir. 1953) (broad discretionary powers maintained by president and two directors of
the company). On the application of the Clifford rules, U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §3922(a)-21
(1953), to controlled charitable foundations in general, see Latcham, Private Charitable
Foundations: Some Tax and Policy Implications, 98 U. or PA. L REnv 617, 623-30 (1950).
103. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, §§ 503, 504. See Brown, The New Restrictions On
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rectly through contributions or directly by imbursements. 10 4 Under the old
Code such payments were taxable to the employee if they constituted "income"
within the meaning of old Section 22 (a).105 Where payments were made di-
rectly by the employer without prior contributions to an insurance company or
a private fund they were generally taxed to the employee as "income," e0 un-
less excludable as accident or health insurance proceeds or under some other
provision of the Code.10 7 But, where the employer made contributions to a
separate fund or purchased premiums on commercial insurance, the taxability
of such payments to the covered employee was less certain.
The Internal Revenue Service ruled that employer premium payments for
individual accidental death and disability policies were taxable as "income," 10 8
but that such payments for group medical and hospitalization insurance were
Charitable Exemptions and Deductions For Federal Tax Purposes, 13 U. or PiT. L. Rrv.
623,637 (1952).
104. I.T. 401.1, 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 32; Rev. Rul. 210, 1953 INT. REV. BULL. No. 21 at
5 (1953) (indirect through insurance premiums) ; I.T. 4060, 1951-2 Cumx. BULL. 11, modified
on other grounds, I.T. 4107, 1952-2 Cuas. BULL. 73 (direct payment by employer).
Employer contributions to state-fund plans under the California and New Jersey com-
pulsory sickness and disability insurance statutes are deductible as "taxes." I.T. 3966,
1949-2 Cum. BULL. 27 (California); I.T. 3970, 1949-2 Cum. BULL. 23 (New Jersey). See
INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 23(c) (1); INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 164(a).
See also Rev. Rul. 160, 1953 INT. REV. BULL. No. 18 at 2 (1953) (contributions to an
employee's hospital association deductible); Rev. Rul. 131, 1953 INT. REv. BULL. No, 15
at 7 (1953) (contributions for tornado relief to employees deductible).
105. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1939, § 22(a) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §39.22(a)-3 (1953).
106. Glen E. Blackburn, 15 T.C. 336 (1950); H.N. Henry, 47 B.T.A. 149 (1942);
E.B. Tousek, 1 B.T.A. 1164 (1925); Rev. Rul. 209, 1953 INT. REv. BULL. No. 21 at 3
(1953) ; Rev. Rul. 103, 1953-1 Cum. BuLL. 20; I.T. 4107, 1952-2 Cu1,r. BULL. 73; G.C.M.
23511, 1943 CuM. BULL. 86. See I.T. Info. No. 4, 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAx REl. 1 6051
(1951); Epmeler v. United States, 52-1 U.S. TAx CAs. 9261 (N.D. Ind.), rcv'd, 199
F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952). Contra: Rev. Rul. 131, 1953 INT. REV. BULL. No. 15 at 7 (1953)
(tornado disaster payments ruled not income) ; Special Ruling, 5 CCH 1952 FED. TAx
REP. f 6196 (1952) (food, supplies, and other forms of subsistence received from Red Cross
by a disaster victim ruled not income).
107. Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1952) (accident or health In-
surance) ; Theodate Pope Riddle, 27 B.T.A. 1339 (1939) (damages) ; I.T. 3977, 1949-2
Cums. BULL. 92 (same); I.T. 2420, VII-2 Cum. BULt. 123 (same); Frye v. Commissioner,
72 F. Supp. 405 (D.D.C. 1947) (same) ; William L. Neill, 17 T.C. 1015 (1951) (workmen's
compensation) ; I.T. 3877, 1947-2 CuI. BULL. 15 (same) ; I.T. 3281, 1939-1 Gum. BULL.
97 (same) ; I.T. 3917, 1948-2 Cum. BULL. 10 (same) ; Prince v. United States, 119 F. Supp.
421 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (payments for injury from active service in armed forces) ; I.T. 3855,
1947-1 CuM. BULL. 9 (same); I.T. 3817, 1946-2 CuM. BULL. 34 (same); Schall v. Com-
missioner, 174 F2d 893 (5th Cir. 1949) (gift); David R. Daly, 3 B.T.A. 1042 (1926)
(same).
On excludability of damages see Schlenger, Disability Benefits under Section 22(b)(5),
40 VA. L. Ray. 549, 553 (1954). For excludability of workmen's compensation see id. at
553, 557 (1954) ; Note, 16 A.L.R.2d 1334 (1951).
108. Rev. Rul. 210, 1953 INT. REV. BULL. No. 21 at 5 (1953) (accidental death and
total disability). This ruling has been generally assumed to concern accident or health
insurance, see text at note 111 infra, but the insurance policies involved seem more closely to
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not.10 9 Employer contributions to privately funded group arrangements were
also ruled not taxable as "income" to the employees. 110  Mthough the rulings
do not specify the key factor of differentiation, the distinction has generally
been assumed to be between individual and group accident or health insur-
ance."' If this assumption is correct, the distinction may be partially explained
in terms of administrative convenience. Whereas the value to the employee
of employer purchased premiums on an individual policy may be presumed
to be the amount paid by the employer, difficult questions of premium allo-
cation arise in attempting to fix the value to the employee of a group pre-
mium. For example, if a group policy requiring no medical examination
includes a person uninsurable under individual policies, coverage will be more
valuable to him than to other group members."- Another explanation for
the differentiation between individual and group arrangements is that it con-
stitutes an extension to accident or health insurance of a similar rule re-
garding life insurance. While employer-purchased premiums on individual
policies or group permanent policies of life insurance are taxable to his em-
ployees as income, employer purchased premiums on group term-life policies
are not.113 The distinguishing factor is that the group term insurance is for-
feited by the employee on termination of employment, 11"t whereas the other
resemble life insurance. There does not appear to be any ruling that employer purchased
premiums on individual policies of accident or health insurance, i.e., temporary disability
or medical expense insurance, are taxable to the employee.
109. Special Ruling, 3 CCH 1943 FED. TAx REP. 116587 (1943) (group medical and
hospitalization).
110. Rev. Rul. 130, 1953 INr. REv. Buu_ No. 15 at 6 (1953) (private plan under New
York compulsory sickness and disability insurance statute) ; cf. I.T. 3738, 1945 Cu.. BuL.
90 (union fund wherein employees had no contractual right to benefits).
111. See Comment, 21 U. oF CH . L. REv. 277, 279 (1954); Schlenger, Disatility
Benefits Under Section 22(b)(5), 40 VA. L. REv. 549, 568 (1954) ; SEX;. RE'. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 185 (1954).
The distinction could have been between loss of earnings (disability) insurance and
medical and hospitalization insurance, although there would be no apparent reason for such
a distinction.
See note 108 supra, for the possibility that employer purchased premiums on individual
accident or health policies are not taxable to the emplokee.
112. See Guttentag, Leonard, & Rodewald, Federal Income Taxation of Fringe Bene-
fits: A Specific Proposal, 6 NAT. TAx J. 250, 260 (1953).
113. Mlimeo. 6477, 1950-1 Cums. Bui.L 16 (group-term and group permanent distin-
guished), modifying L.O. 1014, 2 Cum. BuLu_ S8 (1920), and U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 3922
(a)-3 (1953); G.C.M. 16069, XV-1 Cum. BULL. 84 (1936) (individual and group life
policies distinguished). See also Beacham, Taxable Inzcome Front the Receipt of Property
Other Than Cash, 22 Miss. L.J. 189, 200 (1951) ; Note, 7 A.L.R.2d 766 (1949).
114. Ibid.
For a discussion of termination of the employee's insurance under group life and dis-
ability policies see Collier, Termination of Employment Under Group Policies, 9 Ass.- op
LIFE INs. COUNSEL PROCEEDIN S 237 (1946); VANCE, INSURANCE §203 (3d ed. 1951);
CRAWroRD, GRoup IxsuRxAxca § 32 (1936) ; Note, 105 A.L.R. 413 (1936). See also N cte,
36 Coi. L. REv. 89 (1936).
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types of life policies have savings features such as paid-tip values.115 The
rationale is that coverage which is forfeitable has not been sufficiently realized
by the employee to constitute income."" Like group term-life policies, group
loss-of-earnings policies are generally forfeited by the employee on termination
of employment. 11 7 Therefore, application of the group term-life insurance rule
to such policies would seem appropriate. But the rationale is inapplicable to
group medical and hospitalization insurance of the Blue Shield-Blue Cross type,
which generally provides non-forfeitable coverage on a monthly basis.'1" There-
fore, under the old Code, if the Service had decided to tax the employee for
the employer purchased premiums on such insurance it might well have been
sustained by the courts. Furthermore, several commentators have suggested
that employer contributions to all accident or health arrangements be taxed as
"income" to the employee.110 Thus, while the issue of taxability to the em-
ployee of employer contributions was ostensibly settled by the assumed dis-
tinction of the Service between group and individual policies, uncertainty
actually prevailed as to what contributions could be taxed to the employee.
In attempting to bypass the "income" problem with its inherent uncertainties,
the new Code establishes another indefinite standard. Section 106 provides that
employer contributions to accident or health "plans for ... employees" are not
taxable to the employee. 120 The ambiguities of that crucial phrase have already
been discussed.12' The Section 106 exclusion applies to both individual and
group insurance policies which fall under "plans.' 1 22 Since most group insur-
ance policies will probably constitute "plans," the new Code appears to estab-
lish that employer-purchased group premiums are not taxable to the employee.
However, many individual commercial policies probably will neither themselves
constitute "plans" nor be secured pursuant to "plans,' ' i 23 and therefore the tax-
ability of their employer contributions will again hinge on the uncertain "in-
come" test. On the other hand, the new Code confirms that employer con-
tributions to privately financed arrangements are not taxable to the employee.
If such an arrangement constitutes a "plan," the employer's contributions are
115. See rulings cited note 113 supra.
116. Ibid.
117. See Van Zanten v. Nat. Casualty Co., 333 Mich. 28, 34, 52 N.W.2d 581,584 (1952);
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Howard, 238 Ky. 108, 36 S.W.2d 857 (1931) ; CaAwFoR1u,
GROUP INSURANcE §§ 32, 63-5 (1936).
118. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Adrian Conway, Director of
Public Relations, Connecticut Medical Service Inc. (Connecticut Blue Shield Plan), dated
Nov. 12, 1954, in Yale Law Library.
119. See Guttentag, Leonard, & Rodewald, Federal Income Taxation of Fringe Bene-
fits: A Specific Proposal, 6 NAT. TAX J. 250, 260-3 (1953).
120. See note 55 supra.
121. See pp. 230-36 supra.
122. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A35 (1954); SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 185-6 (1954).
123. See interpretations of "plan" in notes 78 and 79 srepra. But see interpretation in
note 77 supra.
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excluded from gross income of the employee by Section 106. And if the
arrangement does not qualify as a "plan," the employer's contributions will
probably not be sufficiently realized by the employee to constitute "income."124
EMPLOYEE CONTRIBUTIONS
Tax treatment of employee contributions remains the same under the new
Code as under the old. To the extent that employee contributions for accident
or health protection are allocable to medical coverage, they are deductible as
medical expenses.1 -5 But to the extent that such contributions are apportion-
able to loss-of-earnings protection, they have been ruled not deductible either
as medical expenses 126 or business expensesYm r Where an accident or health
arrangement contains both medical and loss-of-earnings features, contribution
allocation is necessary to determine the employee's proper deduction. 1 If both
employer and employee contribute to the program, they may gain maximum
deductions for the employee by agreeing that his contributions be allotted first
to medical coverage.1 9
The ruling that employee contributions to loss-of-earnings arrangements
are not deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses is of doubtful
merit. Courts have allowed employers to deduct contributions to strike-funds
designed in part to compensate them for income lost during periods of economic
124. See text at notes 85 and 110 supra.
125. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, §213(e) (1) (A); Ixr. REv. CODE OF 1939, §23(x); U.S.
Treas. Reg. 118, §39.2 3(x)-1 (1953); Rev. Rul. 19, 1953-1 Cum. Buu.. 59; cf. Jess H.
Taylor, 11. T.C.M. 652 (1952).
126. Rev. Rul. 19, 1953-1 Cum. BULL 59; Special Ruling, 5 CCH 1950 FED. TAx RE.
ff6124 (1950) ; LT. 3967, 1949-2 Cum. BuL.. 33; LT. 3970, 1949-2 Cum. BuL. 23. But
cf. Jess H. Taylor, 11 T.C.M. 652 (1952). See Rewrite Bulletin, 5 CCH 1953 Fun. TAx
REP. ff 8674 (1953).
127. LT. 4005, 1950-1 Cum. BULL 47; LT. 3966, 1949-2 Cum. BuL. 27; I.T. 3G63,
1944 Cum. BuLL. 110; accord: LT. 1265, I-1 CuM. BULL 193 (1922); cf. LT. 1918, 111-1
CuM. BuL. 121 (1924) (private unemployment compensation plan). The issue was raised
but not decided in Elwood J. Clark, 5 T.C.M. 236, aff'd per curiam, 158 F.2d 851 (6th Cir.
1946). See also I.T. 288, XIV-1 Cum. BuL. 54 (1935) (contributions to labor union for
unemployment benefits deductible but contributions for sick, accident, and death benefits
non-deductible). This ruling has been criticized for holding contributions for sick and
accident benefits non-deductible. See Gordon, Tax Effects of Union IVclfare Funds, 6
TAX L. REv. 1, 40-1 (1950).
However, if the employee contributions are made to a state-fund plan under a compulsory
disability statute, they are generally deductible as "taxes." See note 140 infra.
128. Rev. Rul. 19, 1953-1 Cum. BULL. 59. See Rewrite Bulletin, 5 CCH 1953 FED.
TAx REP. ff8674 (1953).
129. See P.S. No. 32, 3 CCH 1944 Fun. TAx REP. ff6568 (1944), concerning a pension
plan which contained both life insurance and annuity features and to which both employers
and employees contributed. The plan provided that the employer's contribution should be
first applied to the annuity feature, in order to save the employee from taxation on life in-
surance premiums purchased by the employer. The ruling w-as that the plan qualified as
a pension plan under old § 165(a), thereby implying that the allocation would achieve its
purpose.
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inactivity.130 Employee loss-of-earnings arrangements are similarly devised to
cushion employees during periods of unemployment due to sickness.lt8 Thus
employee contributions to such arrangements should be considered deductible
business expenses.132  Moreover, since employer contributions are now gen-
erally excluded from the employee's gross income,133 denial of deductibility to
employee contributions results in a tax discrimination between employer and
employee financed arrangements. Employee A who receives $39 in cash plus
$1 in excludable loss-of-earnings contributions pays a lower tax than employee
B who receives $40 in cash and contributes a non-deductible $1 for coverage.
The same discrimination exists between employer and employee financed medi-
cal programs whenever any part of the employee's contributions is denied de-
ductibility because the employee's other medical expenses are too small.184 How-
ever, this latter inequity cannot be corrected under present law since such con-
tributions are more in the nature of personal than business expenses.1 5
The situation is further complicated by an irrationally diverse treatment of
contributions made under non-occupational disability statutes. These statutes
provide for loss-of-earnings payments to employees during periods of disability
due to accident or sickness incurred outside the scope of employment, 18' Al-
130. George M. Cohan, 11 B.T.A. 743, 760 (1928) ; Sam H. Harris, 11 B.T.A. 871,
874 (1928) ; H. A. Allen, 7 B.T.A. 1256,1275-6 (1927).
Employee contributions for unemployment benefits have also been ruled deductible as
business expenses. I.T. 2888, XIV-1 Cum. BULL. 54 (1935) ; Mimeo. 4595, 1937-1 CUIM.
BULL. 63. But cf. I.T. 1918, III-1 Cum. BULL. 121 (1924).
131, See 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrIcE §§ 16-17 (1941); SoMmn,
MANUAL OF ACCIDENT AND HEALTH INSURANcE 12, 33-7 (1928); Curran, The Funda-
mentals of Accident and Health Insurance, 1953 INs. L.J. 555-71 (1953).
132. See Gordon, Tax Effects of Union Welfare Funds, 6 TAx L. REv. 1, 40-1 (1950)
(suggesting that contributions for loss-of-earnings benefits be deductible as ordinary and
necessary business expenses). The issue was raised but not decided in Elwood J. Clark, 5
T.C.M. 236, aff'd per curiamn, 158 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1946).
But see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 265(1) ; INT. Ray. CODE OF 1939, § 24(a) (5) ; and
U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.24(a)-4 (1953), disallowing deduction for expenses allocable to
classes of tax-exempt income. Since commercially insured loss of earnings proceeds at-
tributable to employee contributions are tax-exempt under new § 104 (a) (3), any suggestion
of deductibility of such contributions would seem mooted by new § 265(1). But because
of uncertainty as to whether proceeds of private arrangements attributable to employee
contributions will be excludable as received under a "plan for employees," see pp. 230-36
supra, the issue remains alive with regard to employee contributions to such arrangements.
However if the standard deduction under § 144 or the optional tax under § 3 is elected
the deduction would not be available. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3 and 144.
133. Employer contributions may be excludable either as contributions to a "plan"
under § 106 or as not constituting "income" within § 61. See text at notes 120-4 supra,
134. As a general rule, § 213 permits deduction only of medical expenses in excess of
3 percent of adjusted gross income. INT. REV. CODE Or 1954, § 213.
135. Personal expenses are non-deductible under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 262.
136. Such statutes have been enacted by California, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode
Island. CAL. UNEMPLOY. INS. CODE §§ 2601 et seq. (Deering, 1954) ; 43 N.J.S.A. §§ 21-25
et seq. (1950) ; N.Y. WORKIEN'S ComP. LAW § 200 et seq.; R.I. Acrs c. 1200 (1942).
See generally, Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 647-72 (1951) ; Honey, Compulsory Nonoccupa-
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though the statutes provide for financing the payments by requiring employee
or employer-employee contributions to a state fund, 37 they generally permit
commercial insurance or employer self-insurance as alternatives to the state-fund
plan.' 38 Employee contributions to commercially or privately insured arrange-
ments approved under a statute have been ruled non-deductible. 32 However,
employee contributions to a state fund are deductible as "taxes" where the statute
imposes the obligation to pay the state fund directly on the employee. 40 But
the New York statute requires employees to contribute to the employer, upon
whom a direct liability to pay benefits is imposed and who may elect from the
alternatives of private, commercial, or state-fund insurance.'" Even if the em-
ployer elects the state-fund plan the employee contributions are not deductible,
probably on the theory that the incidence of the tax is only indirectly on the
employee.1
4 2
Since state-fund plans do not differ functionally from private loss-of-earnings
plans, either statutory or non-statutory, the tax treatment of their employee
contributions should be the same. This result can be accomplished in two ways
within the present statutory framework. 4 3 Employee contributions to state-
fund plans could be denied deductibility as "taxes" on the long-standing rule
that monetary levies which are regulatory rather than revenue-raising are not
deductible "taxes" within the meaning of the income tax laws. 144 Or employee
contributions to non-state-fund plans could be considered deductible business
tional Disability Benefits Legislation, 1952 Ixs. L.J. 691 (1952); Note, 1 SvnAcusz L
REV. 278 (1949).
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid. The Rhode Island statute does not have such a provision. R.I. Acrs c.
1200 (1942).
139. I.T. 3967, 1949-2 Curs. BuL. 33 (California); I.T. 3970, 1949-2 Cum. BULL.
28 (New Jersey); I.T. 4005, 1950-1 Cum. BuLt. 47 (New York) ; Special Ruling, 5 CCH
1950 FED. TAx REP. 6124 (1950) (New York).
140. I.T. 3966, 1949-2 Cum. BULL 27 (California) ; I.T. 3970, 1949-2 Cu.z Bu.L. 28
(New Jersey); I.T. 3663, 1944 Cum. BuLL. 110 (Rhode Island). Iz;T. R v. CoDE or 1939,
§23(c) (1) ; INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 164.
141. N.Y. WoRxaam s Comp. L~w §§209-11; see Note, 1 SYRAcusc L REv. 278
(1949).
Despite the technical way in which liability is imposed on the employer, the effect of the
statute is clearly to place a tax burden on the employee.
142. I.T. 4005, 1950-1 Cus.T BuLL. 47 (denying deductibility as a tax or business ex-
pense) ; see also Special Ruling, 5 CCH 1950 FED. TAX REP. 16124 (1950) (denying de-
ductibility as a medical expense).
For the probable rationale underlying denial of deduction as a "tax" see, e.g., G.C.M.
15101, XIV-2 Cu. BULL 65 (1935) (denying deductibility as a "tax" to gasoline con-
sumers in 'Mississippi where state gasoline taxes were imposed on the dealer). Mhen the
Mississippi statute was amended to provide that the tax "may be passed on to the ultimate
consumer and such consumer in ascertaining his net income for [State] income tax pur-
poses may deduct any such taxes he has actually paid ... ! the ruling was reversed. See
G.C.M. 25579, 1948-1 Cum. BuL 36 (allowing deductibility by the consumer as a "tax").
143. I.e., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954.
144. See, e.g., I.T. 3511, 1941-2 Ctm. BULL. 90.
19541
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
expenses. The latter solution would not only remove tax discrimination be-
tween employee contributions to state-fund and other types of plans but would
also eliminate inequity between employer and employee financed plans. How-
ever, this proposal would create a loophole on the proceeds level which would
allow high salaried employees to gain unlimited tax-free accident or health
benefits. The $100 per week limitation in Section 105 (d) on loss-of-earnings
benefits attrib.table to employer contributions could be avoided if the employee
purchased insurance, thereby coming within the unlimited exclusion provisions
of Section 104(a) (3).145 Thus, given the treatment of proceeds tinder the new
Code, deductibility of employee contributions would be undesirable. And while
the alternative proposal of disallowing all employee contributions as deductions
would not engender any problems on the proceeds level, it would exacerbate the
tax inequity between employer and employee financed arrangements. 140
The new Code not only does not deal with the problem of discrimination be-
tween employee contributions to state-fund and other types of plans, but it also
fails in its attempt to alleviate the inequitable distinction between employer and
employee financed programs. The new Code seeks equality of treatment by
adjusting proceeds taxation. While proceeds remain basically excludable under
Section 104(a) (3), the general provisions of Section 105 require taxation of
amounts received through accident or health insurance (including all "plans for
employees") which are "attributable" to employer contributions not previously
"includable" in the employee's taxable income.147 Even disregarding the numer-
ous exceptions in Section 105, this general rule would be only a slight improve-
ment, since it avoids making a policy decision on the question of whether
accident or health arrangements should be taxed on the contribution or proceeds
level, and constitutes instead a hodgepodge compromise. 148 Moreover, it creates
145. See note 36 supra.
146. This proposal would merely extend non-deductibility of employee contributions
to the area of state fund plans.
For a discussion of the inequity between tax treatment to the employee of arrangements
financed by employer contributions and those financed by employee contributions, see text
at notes 133-4 supra.
147. See note 37 supra.
148. The theory underlying the general rule of § 105 is to adjust the existing tax dis-
crimination against employee-financed arrangements on the contributions level by creating
a countervailing discrimination against employer-financed arrangements on the proceeds
level. Hence the § 105 phrase "amounts ... attributable to contributions by the employer
which were not includible in the gross income of the employee . .. ." However, discrimi-
nation now exists on two levels instead of one. Thus, employee A, covered by an employer-
financed "plan," receives $10 in employer contributions tax-free but then receives $1000 in
proceeds wholly taxable since attributable to the employer contributions not taxed to him.
Employee B contributes $10 in non-deductible contributions to an employee-financed "plan"
and receives $1000 in proceeds tax-free. If the figures are reversed the outcome is equally
absurd. This is indeed an odd form of equity. Either contributions should be tax-free to
the employee and proceeds taxed or vice versa, regardless of whether the "plan" is em-
ployer or employee financed.
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the new problem of defining "plan for employees."' 149 However, at least it con-
tends with the problem of discrimination on the contribution level by establish-
ing a countervailing discrimination on the proceeds level. 150 Unfortunately,
the rule's many exceptions substantially negate whatever beneficial effect it
otherwise might have had. All medical reimbursements, payments for perma-
nent injuries, and loss-of-earnings benefits up to $100 per week are excepted
from the "rule" of Section 105.'15 There are presumably few accident or health
arrangements providing benefits which fall outside these exempt categories. 15 2
-And therefore the discrimination between employer and employee financed
arrangements remains substantially as before.
CONCLUSION
The new Code fails to remedy the inequality of tax treatment between em-
ployer and employee financed accident or health arrangements. And although
it pretends to distinguish between loss-of-earnings and medical expense arrange-
ments, in practical effect it does not. Moreover, instead of resolving the con-
troversy over what constitutes "insurance," it has increased uncertainty by
adding the undefined phrase "plan for employees."
It would not be difficult to improve tax treatment of accident or health
arrangements. To remedy the inequality between employer and employee
financed programs, employee contributions to both loss-of-earnings and medi-
cal benefit arrangements should be made fully deductible.lm And all employer
contributions to such arrangements should be excludable from the employee's
gross income. Loss-of-earnings proceeds should be taxable since their function
is to replace income and they are in no way related to the amount of medical
or other expenses incident to sickness or injury. 4 Medical and hospitalization
benefits, however, are directly related to the amount of extraordinary expenses
resulting from sickness or injury and are therefore deserving of a special tax
exemption.155 And since there is no reason to confine either the deductibility
of contributions or the exemption of medical benefits to employees, or to em-
ployees covered by "insurance" or a "plan," these provisions should be avail-
able to all individuals.
149. See pp. 230-36 supra.
150. See note 148 supra.
151, See notes 39-41 supra.
152. See note 43 supra.
153. This deduction should be allowed in addition to the standard deduction so that
election of the latter will not vitiate the effectiveness of the former.
154. However, in some cases the only type of accident or health proceeds received will
be loss-of-earnings benefits. Since a portion of these benefits will in effect reimburse the
recipient for medical expenses, they should be tax-exempt to that extent.
155. As the receipt of medical benefits will serve to reduce the medical expense de-
duction if received in the same year or be includable in gross income to the extent attribu-
table to prior years' medical expense deductions, see note 11 supra and INT. Rv. COD oF
1954, §§ 105(b), 213(a), the proposed exemption will be significant only with regard to
amounts below the minimum or above the maximum of allowable medical expense deduc-
tions.
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